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UNDER THE LIEN THEORY OF MORTAGAGES IS THE
MORTGAGE ONLY A POWER OF SALE?
By BERNARD C. GAVIT*
I.
T HE shock to legal theory which followed the intervention of
equity and the legislature into the field of real estate mortgages
has left the courts and writers altogether inarticulate and uncer-
tain as to the results. It has been accepted as axiomatic that the
ruins cannot be explained or classified under any of the common
law concepts as to estates or interests in real estate; that the
mortgage has become sui generis without relative or friend.
"How, then may a mortgage at the present day be defined?
Baron Parke, spealdng of the mortgagor, said: 'He can be de-
scribed only by saying he is a mortgagor.' In the same way it may
be said that the most accurate and comprehensive definition of a
mortgage is that it is a mortgage."'
But now that the conversion has become quite complete and
settled, and equitable rules have been accepted as the common
law or statutory rules on the subject, is it not possible to ex-
tract from the situation a re-definition of the mortgage which
will be both accurate and illuminating? It is submitted that that
*Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Blooming-
ton, Indiana.
'Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., 21. Mr. Tiffany makes no attempt to
define "Mortgage." See, 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2358
et seq. Professor Durfee reaches the conclusion that under the "lien"
theory the mortgagee has a "legal interest" in the land, but he makes
no attempt to fit it into any previous classifications of legal interests in
land. See Durfee, The Lien Theory of the Mortgage-Two Crucial
Problems, (1913) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 505; and also Durfee, The
Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage-Some Generalizations,
(1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 587. See a criticism of these articles (and
the general language employed by the courts) by Sturges and Clark:
Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 691.
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is possible and that in the so-called lien theory states the conven-
tional mortgage is either a common law or statutory power of
sale; no more, and no less.
II.
It is submitted, too, that so to regard it will result in the re-
moval of much of the confusion which is inherent in the present
language of the courts. It is said, for example, that the debt
is the principal thing and the mortgage but an incident; that
the mortgagee has no estate or interest in the land; that his in-
terest in the security is personal property. On the other hand
it is said that nevertheless subsequent purchasers take subject
to the mortgage; that it is a contract concerning an interest in real
estate within the statute of frauds ;' that the law of merger of
interests operates against it; that the statute of limitations govern-
ing causes of action in regard to real estate applies.
The first confusion arises out of the erroneous conclusion
that because the law of descent and distribution disposes of the
mortgagee's interest as personal property that therefore it is not
an interest in real estate. The obvious answer is that a num-
ber of interests in real estate are distributed in that manner, not
because they are personal property, but because they are not
inheritable interests in real estate. A lease for ninety years is
obviously an interest in land, but it was a chattel real and passed
to the next of kin, rather than the heirs.
The courts today have rather abandoned the nomenclature
concerning chattels real and erroneously have said that because
the mortgage interest descended to the next of kin rather than
the heirs that, therefore, it was personal property. Quite ob-
viously one can answer: "non-sequitur." All that can be truth-
fully said is that it passes the same as personal property. Surely
it can still be an interest in real estate despite that.
It is certainly unnecessary to go into detail to prove that it
is an interest (of some sort) in real estate. The instances cited
above as to' the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations,
2Browne, Statute of Frauds, 5th ed., see. 267. The authority which
the learned author cites is meager, and does not fully sustain the con-
clusion. It is submitted that the mortgage comes within statutes
requiring all conveyances of land or any interest therein to be in writ-
ing rather than within the statute as to contracts for the sale of lands.
See 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 603.
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the law of merger, and the law of bona fide purchaser are really
quite conclusive on the score.3
Probably greater than the confusion which arises out of calling
the mortgage interest personal property (or what is worse, calling
it "only a chose in action") is the confusion which is inherent
in the accepted language of the courts to the effect that the
mortgagor retains legal title and the mortgagee has only a lien.
Again the authorities have been too literal in their application
of this supposed rule. This language has been, in effect, remodeled
to read, "the morgagor retains all of the legal title, and the
mortgagee has only a lien, which is not title."
To begin with, "lien" is, at least historically, a misnomer. To-
day, however, it seems to have at least three distinct meanings.
Originally a lien was only a right to possession.4 For no very
good, or apparent, reason here it has been extended to mean
something quite different. It is suggested that possibly the confu-
sion arose out of saying that, for example, a bailee had a lien
for his charges for services: the lien (or right to possession)
therefore was security for his debt. It was then assumed, or said,
that every security was a lien, regardless of whether the right
given as security was a right to possession, a right to use or sell -
to satisfy the debt, or all of them. Today, therefore, when in
this connection the courts talk of one having a lien they mean
that he has a security for his claim.5
If the parties are dealing with tangible personal property which
is delivered to the mortgagee or if they are dealing with real
property and the mortgagee is put in possession it is' apparent
that the latter has both actual possession and the right to con-
tinued possession as security. But actual possession is after all
3See Durfee, The Lien Theory of the Mortgage-Two Crucial
Problems, (1913) 11 Mich. L. Rev. 495. This is further illustrated by
the fact that in the event the property is taken by eminent domain
the mortgagee has a claim to the proceeds. Mills, Eminent Domain,
2nd ed., sec. 74.
4Jones, A Treatise on The Law of Liens 3, 13.5A "lien" may therefore be a right to possession as security; it
may be some other interest as security. It is also said, for example,
that the beneficiary of a trust may follow the trust property into the
hands of one (at least) who is not a bona fide purchaser, and that
he has a lien upon the property in the hands of such a third person.
"Lien" here has a third connotation and means "equitable title."
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only the present enjoyment of the right to possession of the
property in question as against the general owner, the public gen-
erally and the state. It is only a right in relation to that prop-
erty as against others. He became the owner of that right (or
interest) by reason of a lawful consensual act on the part of the
previous owner. It is clearly true, then, that in any case a so-
called mortage lien can only be some legally recognized interest,
or'interests, in relation to specific property, which is given as se-
curity for the payment of money, or the performance of some
other obligation by the general owner.
What the interest, or interests may be, is the question. Are
they a transfer of existing legally recognized interests, or are they
the result of the creation of some new legally recognized inter-
ests? As stated above they must consist of interests in relation
to specific property. (The property may be either tangible or
intangible, but we are concerned here only with real property.)
If the mortgage be security, and it is some legally recognized in-
terest in the real estate which is the security, it follows that the
mortgagee acquires it solely' because, through an intentional act
(which is the equivalent of a deed when a grantor transfers all
of his interests to a grantee) the mortgagor intended the mort-
gagee to have that interest as security. It is obvious, therefore,
that ordinarily the security would have to be at least one inter-
est which was a part of the mortgagor's interests in the prop-
erty. Although in a few instances the law allows the owner of
real estate to create new real property rights, as, for example,
in the law of convenants running with the land," normally the
rights are traditional, and are treated in law as existing component
parts of the owner's "title." The rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities which the law creates in favor of an owner in respect
to a specific piece of property constitute his title or ownership.7
What one does then when he gives another his real estate
as a security for a debt is that he transfers one or more of his
interests in regard to the real estate to the mortgagee. How many
he transfers depends upon the intention of the parties and the
law. Under the common law he transferred practically all of
6fligelow, The Content of Covenants In Leases, (1914) 12 Mich.
L. Rev. 639; Gavit, Covenants Running with The Land, (1930) 24 Ill.
L. Rev. 786, (1930) 5 Ind. L. J. 432, (1930) 9 Ore. L. Rev. 347.7American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Property,
Tentative Draft No. 1 (1929) pp. 11, 17-23.
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them, retaining only the possible right of re-entry. Under the
law of mortgages today he transfers more or less of them, de-
pending upon how far the law of a particular jurisdiction has
departed from the original common law.
Instead, therefore, of it following that because the mortgagor
retains the legal title that the mortgagee has only a lien, it neces-
sarily must be that the mortgagor retains practically all of the
legal title, and he gives the mortgagee some, or one, of the rights,
privileges, powers and immunities which the law recognizes as
real property interests.
IV.
The inquiry then narrows itself down to the question as to
whether the mortgage interest is one of the traditional real prop-
erty interests, or estates,8 rather than a new interest or estate.9
There was no reason originally why an owner of real prop-
erty could not convey all of his interests, as owner, as security
for the payment of the debt. The original mortgage was such a
transaction. Because the entire title was given as security, and
not absolutely, it was given conditionally; that is, if the grantor
paid the debt he was to have his title back. This was simply what
the law of real property called a condition subsequent, and the
transaction was given that effect. However, in substance the trans-
action was a forfeiture of the grantor's title in satisfaction, or
partial satisfaction of his debt. Equity intervened and created
the equity of redemption, but allowed it to be "foreclosed." That
is, the chancellor set a time beyond which the mortgagor could
not redeem. The sole result of that was that in equity the time
for the performance of the condition subsequent was not that
agreed upon by the parties, but the one fixed by the chancellor.
But it still operated, under the extension of time by the chancellor,
as 4 condition subsequent, and if unperformed by the grantor the
grantee's fee simple estate became indefeasible.
But guided by what probably was at least a remnant of the ec-
SAn estate in land is an aggregate of certain interests measured
by the time element, or other conditions or events. "The most distinc-
tive feature of the law of land as established in England, and from
there brought to this country, is the doctrine of estates, by which the
duration of one's right to possession of the land, with the incidental
rights of user, is made dependent on the character of the estate which
he has in the land." 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 35.
OSee note 1, supra.
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clesiastical suspicion that the lending of money was immoral,
the courts and legislatures came to the conclusion that it would
do no harm to put a few more stumbling blocks in the path of
one who would insist on security for his debt. So the law took
away the owner's power to convey his whole title as security, and
finally said he can only give a "lien." As we have seen this means
that he gives a security and the question remains what does he
give as security? What part of his title is it that is the security?
V.
Clearly it is not an estate. The only one of the common law
estates which might fit in is the estate on a condition precedent,
that is, a fee simple to begin in the future, upon the default in
payment of the debt. Today the law of seisin would in most states
not prevent such a legal estate,10 but the decisive objection to it
is that it would be an inheritable interest in land, whereas the
mortgage interest is not inheritable.
Conceivably the mortgagor might give as security only the
right to possession; the right to use; the power to sell; the right
against trespass; the right to the rents and profits; or a combina-
tion of any or all of them, as well as others; and he might give
them presently, or conditionally in the future. Obviously some
of the legally recognized interests which constitute his title woulf
as a practical matter be of little value as security. This would
be true, both intrinsically and from the view point of negotiability
and marketability. For example, the right against trespass is.in-
"trinsically of little value on the market;" the right to possession
might well be intrinsically valuable, but as a practical proposition
its market value might be quite speculative.
If one were concerned in looking after the interests of the
mortgagee, and at the same time protecting the mortgagor by
allowing the use of as small a portion of his title as security as
possible, what single interest, if any; would he choose? The ready
answer is the power of sale. If the mortgagor gives the mortgagee
a power of sale, does not the latter have as complete protection
as if he had all of the title on a condition precedent? Obviously
he has. In effect he may acquire all the title, or the market value
of all the title, although owning only a very small part of the
title.
101 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., pp. 261, 547.
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It is submitted that by judicial decision and legislative enact-
ment the interest of the mortgagee has been limited to that, in the
conventional mortgage in the lien theory states. So when AB
"mortgages and warrants to CD the following described real
estate," the only lawful intent expressed by those words is that
AB "grants and conveys to CD a power of sale of the following
described real estate as .security for a loan of $10,000.00."
We would emphasize the fact that we are talking about the con-
ventional mortgage, and its normal results. A good many of the
states allow other interests to be given as security, for example, the
present or the conditional future right to the rents and profits, and
to possession. But in the absence of any specific mention of other
rights the conventional mortgage normally transfers only a power
of sale. The mortgage may also provide for insurance,", and for
the participation in the management of the mortgagor's business.
It is submitted, however, that these additional rights are purely
contractual; that such agreements do not create a real property
right in favor of the mortgagee. Thus it seems well settled that
the agreement by the mortgagor to insure is not a covenant run-
ning with the land.12
As to participation in the management no case has been found
which decides the point. It seems quite likely, however, that a
court would hold that a transferee of the mortgagor's interests in
the land would not be bound by the agreement.13
If, under the conventional mortgage, the mortgagee gets some
interest in the property beyond a power of sale then the conclu-
sion is wrong. He does not have the right to possession ;14 nor
the right to the rents and profits ;15 nor the right against tres-
"I1n the absence of such a provision there is no right to it. 3
Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 617.
121 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., p. 636, note 11. This must rest
upon the intention of the parties, for there should be no objection to
the creation here of a real property right by covenant, or contract.
It is well settled that such a covenant between landlord and tenant does
run with the land. I Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, sec. 145b.
"3As illustrating the reluctance of the courts to hold that a coven-
ant in a mortgage runs against a transferee of the mortgagor's interest
see, Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. vs. New York & Q. Co. Ry., (1930)
253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887. It was there held that a covenant as
to after acquired property did not bind a merging corporation.
143 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2427.
'
5 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2433 et seq. If the mortgagee
later recovers the rents and profits under a receivership, nor-
mally he does so not because they were granted (either presently or
in the future) to him as a part of his security, but because the security
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pass.16 The truth is that the normal result of the conventional
mortgage is solely that the mortgagee has a power to sell the prop-
erty for the satisfaction of his debt. His power to sell is in fact
usually limited to a sale under a decree of court; but essentially
the sale is still under the power transfer-red to the mortgagee by
the -mortgage, and the sale is simply under the direction of the
court, and through the instrumentality of the sheriff.lr That is,
here the law requires a judicial recognition of the power, and its
extent or measure before the mortgagee can exercise it; but that
does not keep it from being a power of sale, any more than the
fact that the right to specific performance must receive judicial
recognition before it is finally enforceable keeps it from being a
right to specific performance. The requirement as to the judicial
recognition of the power before its exercise is merely in keeping
with the general policy of the law which with few exceptions has
abolished the old law of "self-help" and which requireq one to
seek the aid of the courts and the executive in the recognition
and enforcement- of his legal rights. The policy here is obvious,
which was granted is insufficient; it would seem that the theory is
that the receivership as to the rents and profits is an incident of the
collection of the debt, upon the grounds of insolvency, rather than the
enforcement of additional security. See 3 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd
ed., p. 2442, et seq. It will be noted that in some states statutes allow
a receivership without insolvency. The substance of that is, of course,
that in those states the mortgage is also a conditional future transfer
of the rents and profits.
As to the first proposition it is said in 2 Clark, Receivers, 2nd ed.,
sec. 958, "Ordinarily a receiver other than a receiver in a foreclosure
case distributes property and funds pari passu among all those who
become parties to the proceeding and the party at whose instance
a receiver is appointed has no advantage over the others. But the
mortgage or other lien holder! at whose instance a receiver is appointed
secures an equitable lien on the unpaid rents and profits." The learned
author cites for this proposition only the case of Rider v. Bagley,
(1881) 84 N. Y. 461, 465. The case does contain language to that
effect but any sound basis for .it is difficult to establish, if as in New
York a receiver can be appoinied only on proof of insolvency. See
3 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2442.
163 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2459 et seq. The mortgagee
is entitled to damages for impairment of his security, and to some
extent he is entitled to control the use of the property; but this is
because his interest is a real property interest in relation to that specific
property, and like any other property interest it is protected against un-
lawful invasion. But it is a non-possessory interest and therefore it must
be protected by an action on the case, or some equitable proceeding.
17"Occasionally the statute expressly requires that any sale made
by an executor shall be approved by the probate or other court, and
the effect of such a requirement is to control any discretion intended
to be vested in the executor as regards a sale." 1 Tiffany, Real Prop-
erty, 2nd ed., p. 1053.
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for it prevents the abuses incident to the private exercise of the
power, and at the same time gives the mortgagee the advantages
of the doctrine of res-judicata as to the resulting title.
If the mortgagee may realize on his security by a strict fore-
closure in equity, then again the conclusion is wrong. The lien
theory states are listed by Mr. Jones as follows :18 Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The same authority 9 lists the states
in which a strict foreclosure is prohibited, and there may only
be a sale of the property to satisfy the debt. Of the states listed
above the following are not listed, and there is presumably no
authority directly on the point: Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington, Wyoming.
Of the other states Minnesota 0 and Wisconsin2 1 seem to be
the only ones which permit a strict foreclosure in the technical
sense of those words; but it is also asserted that the usual practice
is to foreclose only by sale in Minnesota.22 The others either by
judicial decision or legislative enactment have a definite rule to
the effect that the mortgagee's sole remedy is a sale.2 3 There are
older cases in some of those states24 saying that if a foreclosure
suit omitted a junior incumbrancer his rights might be foreclosed
by decree. Such a suit, of course, is in reality a suit to quiet title
or remove a cloud, and deals with the redemption (statutory or
equitable) allowed anyone subsequently interested in the prop-
181 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., p. 60.
19Beginning with sec. 1965, 3 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed.
20The cases and statutes are cited in 3 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed.,
sec. 1719, and 1975; also, in Wiltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure, 4th ed.,
sec. 903. See, in particular, 'Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927, sec.
9634-45 and cases cited infra note 22.2
'But it has very limited application. See, 3 Jones, Mortgages,
8th ed., sec. 1987 and 1745; vViltsie, Mortgage Foreclosure, 4th ed.,
sec. 903.22See note 20, and in particular, Wilder v. Haughey, (1874) 21
Minn. 101; Hollingsworth v. Campbell, (1881) 28 Minn. 18, 8 N. W.
873; Morey v. Duluth, (1897) 69 Minn. 5, 71 N. W. 694; Blanchard
v. Hoffman, (1923) 154 Minn. 531, 192 N. W. 352.
233 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., secs. 1690-1746, 1960-1987.
24Notably Indiana, New York and Iowa.
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erty and has nothing to do with the rights as between the mort-
gagor and mortgagee. 25
Of the states where no decision or statute on the point is listed,
an investigation of previous sections in the book where the usual
methods of foreclosure 6 are set out, discloses that' Mr. Jones
2
7
-
reaches the conclusion that a decree of sale by a court of equity
is the usual method in all of them. In most of them there is specific
statutory provision for the proceedings, and a requirement that the
decree "shall" be for a sale. "It seems certain that the result would
be reached in all of them that a court could no longer enter a
decree of strict foreclosure, were that point to be specifically put
to the courts for decision.
The conclusion is, therefore, that with some exceptions in
Minnesota and Wisconsin, the only normal interest which'the
mortgagee has is a power of sale.28
VII.
Is this power of sale the common law power of sale, or is it
sui generis ?
In substance it is the former. The mortgagee has an ability to
produce a change in the mortgagor's relation to the real estate in
question.29 He has no right against the mortgagor; that is, the
mortgagor may sell without interfering with the mortgagee's in-
terest; his interest, therefore, is a power and not a right.30
In its .essential incidents it is a power. A power was not an
estate in land.31 If it was coupled with an interest it passed to the
one who held the interest.32 A power in gross might be extin-
guished by release. 33 The law of merger (or something similar
253 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2694.
26Which is here, of course, a misnomer. The decree is a decree
of sale and not for the foreclosure (i. e. the cutting off) of the equity
of redemption.
273 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., sec. 1697-1746.28 Some states prohibit a private sale, but in those where it is
allowed its use merely removes the limitation on the power that the
sale be under judicial decree, and the mortgagee has an option to
exercise the power privately or under the direction of a court.
29American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Property,
Tentative Draft No. 1 (1929) sec. 3.
SOAmerican Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Property,
Tentative Draft No. 1 <1929) secs. 1 and 3.
311 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 1041.
321 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 1069.
3 1 Tiffany, Real Property; 2nd ed., p. 1105.
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to it) ordinarily would operate to extinguish it. 34 The sale un-
der a power related back to the time of its creation, and interven-
ing interests were cut off.
35
In all these respects it is identical with the mortgage interest.
VIII.
The only serious objections which can be urged are these:
1. The law of seisin made impossible a conveyance through the
donee of a power; there had to be a conveyance to a trustee to
the uses of the future, exercise of the power;3 6 2. The rule against
perpetuities might apply.
3 7
As to the first. In practically all of the lien theory states
the law of seisin has either been abolished, or its efficacy reduced
to an unascertained minimum.38 There would (in those states) be
no valid objection to a conveyance by the donee of a power, with-
out the intervention of a trust. But even in those states where
the common law or legal theory of mortgages prevails, the prac-
tice and law seems to permit an express power of sale, without
the use of a trustee.
In this connection Mr. Tiffany says:
"Careful conveyancing would seem to call for the insertion in
the conveyance or settlement of the declaration of a use, when-
ever it is sought to create a power of appointment of the legal
title, except as any such necessity may be obviated by statute.
Such is the usage in England, but in this country, with the looser
methods of conveyancing in vogue, it might readily occur that no
use is declared, and a question suggests itself as to the theory
on which, in such a case, the power can be regarded as operat-
ing.
') 9
The learned author doubts that it could be sustained either
as a covenant to stand seised, or as a bargain and sale; but the
fair implication is that it would be upheld on some theory. Later
on the same author says this:
"In view of the very general utilization of powers of sale of
this character (in mortgages) it is surprising that the courts have
not more closely investigated their fundamental character. .. . But
341 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 1106.
353 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2727. As to the theories
involved see Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property,
(1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 480.
361Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 1056.
37 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 1110, et seq.
381 Stimson, Am. St. Law, sec. 1420-27.
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in some decisions in states in which the legal title is vested in the
mortgagee, without any express repudiation of the above view, it
is assumed that the mortgagee's power to sell is a legal power of
appointment, taking effect under the statute of uses." 40
If it be considered, in a particular jurisdiction, however, that
there is prima facie still sufficient life in the law of seisin to cause
trouble, the answer is that the courts and legislatures, as far as
this particular power of sale is concerned, have trampled it un-
der foot until it is as dead as the well-known door nail. When
the courts and legislatures allow a so-called mortgage to trans-
fer a power of sale to the mortgagee; allow the mortgagee to ex-
ercise it (chiefly through the medium of a judicial decree, and
a sale and conveyance by the sheriff) ; recognize as valid the title
which the purchaser acquires at the sale; the objection that what
has been done is in utter disregard of the law of seisin, only
proves that the law of seisin is no longer an objection.
Ix.
As to the rule against perpetuities. That normally an estate
to be created under a power comes within the rule against per-
petuities admits of little doubt. 4' In some states the rule has been
changed to allow a future vesting only within lives in being.42 The
result would be, if the rule were applied, that practically all mort-
gages would be void. This would be true even where the com-
mon law rule still prevails; for the power might be exercised
anytime within twenty years (the usual statute of limitation here)
after default (and few mortgages are given for so short a space
of time as one year.)
But the same difficulty is presented under the legal theory
of mortgages. A condition subsequent logically is within the rule.43
Professor Gray meets the difficulty by suggesting that an excep-
tion must be made.
"Mortgages in fee for the payment of money or the perform-
ance of other acts at a date more than twenty-one years after lives
in being have probably been few. The question may be some day
391 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 319.
403 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., p. 2710.
41Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 473, et seq.;
1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 334, et seq.; 1 Sugden, Powers
p. 468, et seq. Cf. Foulke, Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
(1916) 16 Col. L. Rev. 537.
421 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., sec. 189.
43Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed.,- sec. 562, ef seq.
IS MORTGAGE ONLY A POWER OF SALE?
presented in connection with railroad mortgages. In view of the
large interests likely to be involved, and the novelty of the ques-
tion, the courts may perhaps sustain the validity of such mort-
gages. It is to be hoped, should this be the case, that they will
trankly declare them an exception to the rule against perpetuities,
and not, by attempting to reconcile them with the rule, bring con-
fusion into the rule itself."44
In the lien theory states it is submitted that the courts and
legislatures have already (quite unconsciously in practically all of
the cases) made the exception. Again Professor Gray says :45
"Where no legal title passes to the mortgage as is the case
in several of the United States, it would seem that the mortgagee
would be without security."
But he adds in a note:
"Such mortgages will often be found to have been authorized
or confirmed by legislative action."46
He also quotes47 from the case of Sacramento Bank v. Alsonm :48
"The appeal is supported by very elaborate and forcible briefs,
which, if the questions were open for consideration, would chal-
lenge and receive serious and careful examination, but we do not
think the matter can now be considered open for discussion. Our
own records will disclose the fact that trust deeds have been quite
frequently used as security for loans. Their validity has been up-
held in numerous cases, beginning very soon after the adoption
of the code and continuing until the present time. These decisions,
which have been uniform, establish a conclusion which has be-
come a rule of property, and however thoroughly we might now
be convinced that the rule is erroneous, it should not be disturbed."
In the lien theory states the proceedings for sale are provided
for by statute, and the objection that the power of sale violates
the rule against perpetuities is met by the answer that. to that
extent the legislatures have amended the rule. If the sale is the
result of a rule imposed by court decision, those decisions and
others recognizing the validity of the title obtained by the pur-
chaser, show that the courts have to that extent amended the rule-
The decisions would constitute a rule of property which it is too
late to question.
44Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 570.45Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 571.4GGray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 571, note 3,
p. 463.47Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 3rd ed., sec. 570, note 1,
p. 462.
48(1898) 121 Cal. 379, 53 Pac. 813.
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The conclusion must be that in substance the so-called lien
mortgage is only a power of sale. In so far, and if, there are
.exceptions as against the law of seisin and the rule against perpet-
uities, it might possibly be said that the mortgage is sui generis;
but if one means by that expression that it involves an interest
in real estate not recognized at common law the obvious answer
is it is not sui generis.
